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The students have returned, after the
three weeks of vacation, to resume their
work with renewed energy and determination. The Senior class have taken up the
study of Corporations in the place of Wills,
which latter subject was finished during
last term. Corporations is to be followed
in turn by Bills and Notes, and a short
course in Liens. The Middle class have
taken up Executors and Administrators
and Agency in the place of Real Property
and Sales, which latter subjects were coinpleted last term.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
The work of the Society during the Fall
Term has been uniformly successful, and
all signs point to the completion of the
most successful year in the history of this
organization. The attendance has been
excellent, the interest shown by the various members has been very encouraging,
while the roll of members is larger than
ever before. The programmes have been
good and the sessions of the House of
Representatives were of much value and
interest to all. Various novel and interesting programmes have been resolved on
for the future.

On the last night of thetermthe officers
for the next official term of service were
chosen. The election resulted as follows:
President-John 0. Adamson.
Vice-President--John Kemp.
Secretary-Anthony T. Walsh.
Treasurer-Samuel E. Basehore.
Ex. Committee-Piper, Graul and Lonergan.
It is hoped that during the year the
members will all regularly attend and
take their respective parts in the program
as appointed. The practice in speaking
and debating gained in the meetings is invaluable to the lawyer, and participation
in the work of the society is the duty of
every member. In order that the Allison
Society may maintain the high standard
set by the past meetings it is essential that
regular attendance and work be the aim of
every member. With thehearty co-operation of all, the new administration will be
crowned with even greater success than
those past.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
At the last meeting of the society held
before the Christmas vacation, an interesting debate was had upon the question of
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increasing the U. S. army to one hundred
and twenty-five thousand men. Messrs.
Schantz, Lambert, Claycomb and Points
took part. Several entertainingextemporaneous speeches were rendered on subjects
assigned by the chair.
At the meeting of January 10th, 1901,
Mr. Henderson delivered an effective oration.
In the debate for the evening
M1lessrs. Gross and Ebbert advocated that
the State should be districted and that
the Presidential electors should be elected
in their respective districts. The opposite
view was maintained by Mr. Hickernell
and Mr. Yeagley.
Extemporaneous speeches formed, as
usual, another feature of the program.
The society has come to realize the valuable training gained by this exercise of
the faculties of sudden invention.
The eledtion of new officers on this
occasion resulted in the choice of Mr.
Points for Presfdent, Mr. Harry Brooks
for Vice-President, Mr. Gross for Secretary,
Mr. Gerber for Treasurer and Mr. Ebberb
for Seargent-at-Arms.
The society is in a flourishing condition
at present. Those who do not take an
active part in the work of the literary
societies in the law school are missing an
important feature .f the educational advantages offered by the school.

WEORCAN CLUB.
This -organizatioi, founded last year,
not in opposition to the two regular societies, but as a means of acquiring a fund of
knowledge not within the scope of the
regular law societies, has opened the second year of its existence in an auspicious
manner. Its membership increased, its
purposes successful beyond even the hope
of its founders, it has become a permanent
factor in the life of the school.
During the term concluded the members
read and discussed Longfellow's "Evangeline" and several instructive and inleresting papers were listened to on this subject.
For the long term the literature to be read
and studied will be Shakespeare's "King
Richard III."
The objects and purposes of this club
are to gain facility, not so much in debate;
that can be gained in the regular societies,
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as in the preparation and delivery of orations, essays, etc., and the cultivating of
a good mode of expression in public speaking, together with the knowledge of a few
great English masterpieces. To this end
the members are earnestly working and
the experience gained, however meagre,
will be undloubtedly of some benefit to
.them.
SCHOOL NOTES.
During the latter part of last term the
Senior class effected the following organization:" Pres., Deal; Vice-Pres., Frank;
See., Alexander; Treas., Stauffer.
During the vacation the library has
been increased by the additibn of Mews
English Case Law Digest, in sixteen large
volumes. This is ceitainly a very valuable addition to our library, as heretofore
the btudents have been without any assistance whatever for the followingout of any
subject in detail of the English cases. The
books are all well bound and present an
excellent appearance. The Faculty is to
be commended for purchasing thisvaluable
set of books aiid placing them at the disposal of the students.
Hon. Edwin A. Jaggard was the guest
of.our esteemed Dean for several days during last month. Mr. Jaggard has gained
quite a wide reputation as an author, he
having written a general work on the Law
of Torts, which is published as one of the
Hornbook Series, by the West Pub. Co.
He is at present engaged in the writing of
a book on Taxation in Minn. Mr. Jaggard is a graduate of Dickinson college,
and has been a warm college friend of Dr.
Trickett for many years. He is at present
an Associate Judge of' the Minn. Courts
and also holds the chair in the Minn. University Law School, as Professor of the
Law of Torts.
J. A. Marx, of Kutztown, also a member
of the Berks county bar, was admitted
to the Law School at the opening of the
present term.
Bouton, '03, under the advice of his
physician, has left school and returned
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.home. Mr. Bouton has been on the sick
list for some time, and we hope for him a
speedy recovery.
The musical organizations of the college
are doing good work at rehearsals and both
the Glee Club and Orchestra bid fair to attain, if anything, more than the usual
degree of proficiency.
Max Stauffer, a violinist of unusual
ability, is leading the orchestra with
good results. A, W. Mitchell, '01, is
president of the organizations. The other
Law men are Holcomb, '01, Osborne, 102,
and Hoagland; '03.
An extensive Easter trip is now, being
arranged by the president through the
western part of the state.
ALUMNI NOTES.
John B. T. Caldwell, '98, is in New
Mexico, he having gone there for his
health. The dread disease, consumption,
has set its hand upon him and we hope
the change of climate will succeed in restoring his health.

Jas. B. O'Keefe, '00, was admitted to the
Luzerne county bar durlngDecember, 1900,
he having passed an excellent examination before the exanining board.
Geo. B. Somerville, 197, now at Windber,
Somerset county, was admitted to the bar
of that county last month. Mr. Somerville
had practiced law with Griswold, '97, at
Athens, Pa., for about two years.
Geo. W. Aubrey, '00, was admitted to
practice in the several courts of Northampton bounty on motion wthout examination.

J. H. Williams, '96, has received the
appointment to the office of Assistant District Attorney of Luzerne county.
Samuel B. Hare, '99, was admitted quite
recently to the Blair county bar.
Geo. W. Aubrey, '00, Geo. T. Brown,
'97, and Charles E. Daniels,'98, spent some
time in town about January 16th.
J. HARVEY LINE.

Frank T. Morrow, '98, is engaged in the
real estate and insurance business at Johnstown, Pa.
Eric G. Brotherlin, '96, is at present engaged in clerical work at Pittsburg.
William A. Jordan, '99, spent several
days in town during the holidays. He is
at present located in Pittsburg, and reports
having a lucrative practice.
Harry C. Hubler, '99, was admitted to
practice in the several courts of Lackawanna county, last October. He also spent
several days in town during last month.
S. B. S. Stover,'94, and D. Edward Long,
'99, are sharing the same office in Chambersburg.
Jos. C. Kis.ell, '94, spent several days in
town about Dec. lth, 1900.
Edward Taylor Daugherty has received
the appointmient of Supervisory Principal
of the Mount Jackson High School, Mt.
Jackson, Pa.

J. Harvey Line, Esq., thesubject of this
sketch, was born in Dickinson township,
Cumberland county, Penna., in 1875. H6
received his early education at the district
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school where he lived. His father, a prosperous and conservative farmer, of the old
school type, appreciating the advantages
of an education, sent his son to Dickinson
Preparatory School to begin his higher
education. After attending that school for
several years, he entered the Freshman
class of Dickinson College, September, 1892,
where he completed his academic education, receiving the degree of Bachelor of
Philosophy, in June, ]8. 6.
Immediately after his graduation he
began the study of law in the office of Hon.
R. M. Henderson, of Carlisle, Penna.,
entering Dickinson School of Law in
October of the same year, from which institution he was graduated in June, 1898,
receiving the degree of Bachelor of Laws.
Upon this occasion the advanced academic
degree of Master of Arts was conferred upon
him by Dickinson College.
Mr. Line was admitted as a member of
the Cumberland county Bar, June 8, 1898,
and at once began the practice of his profession in a well equipped suite of offices
on Court House avenue, Carlisle, ]Penna.
While being one of the younger graduates of Dickinson School of Law, he is a
man of uncommon capacity of vigor and
intellect. He maintains among his associates, of no mean character, the reputation
of a lawyer of extraordinary judgment and
ability as is manifested by his success as a
practitioner.
Notwithstanding the extensive professional exactions upon his time, he yet
finds opportunity to devote a portion of
his time to politics. In 1899, he was elected
Republican county chairman, filling the
office so acceptably to the older heads and
party workers that he was re-elected for a
second term; no better proof, indeed, need
be adduced to justify the opinion that he
possesses the unbounded confidence, respect
and admiration of the people of the community, who'are fully able to appreciate
his worth and to compare and measure him
with other men of known eminence. Mr.
Line is prominently spoken of as a probable candidate for District Attorney.
BOOK REVIEWS.
"Law of Partition in Pennsylvania."
Through the kindness of Soney & Sage,
publishers of this work, a copy of it has

been placed in the library of the school.
Of it Hon. James T. Mitchell, of the Supreme court, says "It is very full and complete and most admirably arranged. I
trust that the profession will promptly
appreciate its value."
"Crimes and Criminals," by J. Sanderson Christison, M. D., is a very interesting
and instructive treatise on criminology.
The book presents a series of criminal types
in a brief description of the individual
character and past history. The chapter
on "Crime's Cause and Cure," in which
the author treats especially of heredity and
environments as fundamentals,
and
another chapter on "Prison Treatment"
illustrate the practical bearing of the
treatise. The book contains 177 pages,
illustrated, bound in cloth, and in paper,
and is published by the Meng Publishing
Co., Chicago.
The West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn., have recently issued the third edition of "Norton on Bills and Notes," by
Frances B. Tiffany. The fact that this
work has reached the third edition is evidence of its value, not only 4s a text book
but as a reference work for practitioners.
Examination will show that it is much
augmented by a fuller discussion of the
most important principles of this branch
of the law, together with the publication
of the Negotiable Instrument Law in the
appendix. With the usual feature of the
Hornbook series of bringing out the principal points in black letter type, it contains
a new feature, that of bringing out in the
footnotes in large type the references to the
cases found in the Case books published on
Bills and Notes, the advantages of which
are many.
"Foster's First Book of Practice," by
Lemuel H. Foster, of the Detroit Bar,
second edition. Published by The Collector Publishing Co., Detroit, Mich., price
$4.00 delivered.
This book has filled a long felt want on
the part of young attorneys and law students. It treats the subject in a general
manner and gives the underlying principles of the subject which no other author
has expressed in such an. admirable style.
The authors and publishers are to be corn-
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mended on the excellent style and make-up
of the book. The second edition has just
appeared which goes to show that the book
is well appreciated by the legal fraternity.
"Counsel upon the Reading of Books,"
with an introduction by Henry Van Dyke,
Published by Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
The six papers in this book are based
upon lectures arranged by the American
Society for the Extension of University
Teaching, and were delivered in Philadelphia in the winter of 1898-99. They are
as follows: "History," by H. Morse
Stephens; "Memoirs and Biographies," by
Agnes Repplier; "Sociology, Economics
and Politics," by Arthur T. Hadley; "The
Study of Fiction," by Brander Matthews;
"Poetry," by Bliss Perry, and "Essay and
Criticism," by Hamilton Wright Mabie.
Every studentshould read this book which
is not only Interesting but instructive.
The Collector Publishing Co., of Detroit,
Mich., have recently put upon the market
a new "Treatise on the Law of Real
Property," by John G. Hawley and Malcolm McGregoran advertisement of which
appears in this issue. A careful perusal of
this work will convince one that the
authors have not failed in their attempt to
treat this branch of the law in a concise
and up-to-date manner, as well as arrange
systematically the various divisions of the
Law of Real Estate. The book contains
600 pages, and the price is $4.50, delivered.
"American Law." A treatise on Jurisprudence, Constitution, and Laws of the
United States, by James DeWitt Andrews,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1900. Pp. lxii,
1245. $6.50 net, delivered.
The American Law Review says that
Andrews' "American Law" is the best law
book of the year; that the book is the resuit of many years of painstaking labor,
care, research, planning and replanning,
thinking and rethinking, by a very capable man. The author has attempted to
present the American system of jurisprudence and laws in a simple and natural
order, first the origin and growth of principles, then the present state of the law
fortified by citations carefully selected with
special reference to their historical value

to the student and practical value to the
jurist. The author has endeavored to
produce an institutional elementary treatise or commentary, a work for America,
such as Blackstone is to England.
The oration of Mr. .ustice Story on
Chief Justice Marshall, which was delivered at the request of the Suffolk (Mass.)
bar on October 15, 1835, has just been published in pamphlet form of 60 pages.
Story's association with our greatest
Chief Justice for twenty-four years on the
bench has given him opportunities to know
more of his real character and life than
any other man, and may be considered to
be the most notable of the orations delivered in honor of the eminent patriot and
jurist. It was the intention of the publishers to sell this at 50 cents each but they
have decided to distribute it to those who
will send five cents to cover postage.
Address
LAwYERs' CO-OPERATIVE PUB. CO.,
Rochester, N. Y.
The following is a continuation of the
schedule of counsel in the Moot Conrt
cases issued in last month's FORUm:
PLAINTIFF

DEFENDANT

Case No. 59. Taylor,
Marx,
Katz,
Valentine.
Stauffer, W., J.
" 60. Brock,
Davis,
Detrich,
Brooks.
Holcomb, J.
61. Kemp,
Kern,
Kennedy,
Stauffer, W.
Gery, J.
" "4 62. Bishop,
Gerber,
Donahoe,
Hickernell.
Barr, J.
"
" 63. Ebbert,
Gross,
Longbottom, Jones.
Nicholls, J.
" "1 64. McKeehan, Shipman,
Gery,
Adamson.
Graul, S.
65. Lightner,
Holcomb,
Harpel,
Clark.
Johnston, J.
"
" 66. Core,
Heiriegel,
Keeler,
Shomo.
Davis, 3.
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"

Cannon,
67. Bouton,
Hoagland.
Dever,
Adamson, J.
Lauer,
68. Lambert,
Schanz,
Miller,
Edwards, J.
Walsh,
69. Vastine,
Lord.
Welsh,
Points, J.
Elder,
70. Kaufman,
Phillips.
Mowry,
Rhodes, F.
71. Stauffer, C. M. Hardesty,
Mundy.
Cisney,
Lonergan, J.
Schnee,
72. Rogers,
Yeagley.
Watson,
Rhodes, J.
73. Delaney, F.A., Wright,
Cooper.
McGufflie,
Sterrett, J.
74. Brennan,
DeLaney,
Le Roy,
Williamson,
Mays.
Thorn, J.
Fox,
75. Claycomb,
Sherbine,
Kline,C. S.,
Trude, J.
Bishop,
76. Crary,
Donahoe.
Ebbert,
Turner, J.
77..Longbottom, Gerber,
Hickernell, Gross.
Conry, 3.
Jones,
78. Helriegel,
Core.
Keeler,
Boryer, J.

MOOT COURT.
H. BROWN vs. SHEAFFER & CO.
Action for wrongful death-Acts of 185Z
and 1855 construed-Rightof childto sue
when widow is alive.
FACTS.
Daniel Brown was killed In 1890 in the
rolling mill of Sheaffer & Co. He was
employed by this company and while oiling the machinery he was caught in the
fly wheel. The place through which the
employee had to pass was dangerous. A
widow and five children survived the unfortunate man. The third child became

of age Nov. 1, 1900, and is the plaintiff In
this action, seeking to recover damages for
the loss of his father. The mother and the
two children, who were older than the
plaintiff, failed to bring suit at any time.
The action was brought Nov. 14, 1900.
CONRY and BISHOP for plaintiff.
Rights of widow and of children are distinct, and the widow cannot defeat the
rights of the children by her negligence.
Powers v. Powers, 179 Pa. 531. In the
statute of limitations affecting the remedy
under the acts of 1851 and 1855, there is a
virtual exception in the case of infancy.
The master is here liable for the servant's
injury. Tissue v. R. R. Co., 112 Pa..91;
Schall v. Cole, 107 Pa. 1; Patterson v. R.
R. Co., 7Q Pa. 389.
Fox and EBBERT for defendant.
The servant assumed the risk and the
master is not liable. Hoffman v. Gough,
124 Pa. 505; Stall v. Hoopes, 4 Pa. C. C.
474; Reese v. Clark, 146 Pa. 465; De Forest
v. Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264.
The widow being alive, a child cannot
bring the action, under the act of 1851.
Act of 1855 did not modify the earlier act
in this respect. R. R. Co. v. Decker. 84
Pa. 419; Birch v. Ry., 165 Pa. 339; Lanning
v. Penn. Co., 31 W. N. C. 251. Right of
action is barred by the statute of limitations. 2 P. &. L. Dig. 3236.
OPINION OF THE COURT..

The father of plaintiff was employed by
Sheaffer and Co. in 1890, defendants in
this suit, and while oiling the machinery
he was caught in the fly wheel and killed.
The place through which he had to pass
was dangerous. A widow and five children survived the unfortunate man. The
plaintiff in this case is the third child of
the deceased husband, who became of age
November 1, 1900, and who is seeking to
recover damages for the loss of his father.
The mother and two children, who were
older than plaintift, failed to bring suit at
any other time. This action was brought
November 14, 1900. There are two questions that present themselves in this suit,
viz:
1. Were Sheaffer & Co., defendants, guilty
of negligence?
2. If so, was the plaintiff barred from
bringing an action, by the failure of his
mother to do so, the right by statute having survived to her?
It is a well known rule of law that the
master is not responsible for accidents occurring to his servant, from the ordinary
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risks and dangers which are incident to the
business in which he is engaged; for in
such case the contract is presumed to be
made with reference to such risks. But on
the other hand, where the master voluntarily subjects his servant to dangers, such
as, in good faith he ought to provide
against, he is liable for any accident arising therefrom. When the servant, in
obedience to the master, incurs a risk of
machinery, which though dangerous, is
not so much so as to threaten immediateinjury, or it is reasonably probable may be
used safely by extraordinarycaution, the
master is liable for a resulting accident.
Frazer v. Penn. R. R. Co., 38 Pa. 104; Patterson v. Pitts. & Con. R. R. Co., 76 Pa.
389. In the case at bar the defect from
which the accident occurred was known
to the employee, but as he was injured in
the discharge of a duty imposed upon him
by his employers, such knowledge was adjudged not to raise a presumption of concurrent negligence. The servant does not
stand on the same footihg with the master.
His primary duty is obedience, and if,
when in the discharge of that duty, he is
injured through the neglect of the master,
it is butjust that he should be remunerated.
We think, therefore, that the widow had
a right to recover damages, but, neither
the widow nor the two older sons brought
the action for her. The third son brought
the action as plaintiff and the question
arose as to the second point, "did the right
to bring the action vest solely in the
widow?" If it did not, the thirdson had a
right, as the statute of limitations requiring the action to be brought within one
year, did not begin to run against him
until he became 21 years of age. But it
depends upon the interpretation given to
the Statute. The act of April 15, 1851,
says "whenever death shall be occasioned
by negligence, etc, and no suit be brought
for damages by the party injured during
his or her life, the widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal
representatives may maintain an action
for and recover damages for death thus occasioned. P. & L. Digest Vol. 2 Column
3233, act of April 15, 1851.
The act of April 26, 18.55, says "The persons entitled to recover damages for any
injury causing death, shall be husband,

widow, children or parents of deceased and
no other relative." This act did not repeal
the act of 1851 nor confer any new rights.
It merely designated who could maintain
the action. In other respects the act of
1851 is not repealed by the act of 1855
either expressly or by implication. Birch
v. Pitts. C. 0. & St. L. R. R. Co., 165 Pa.
339.
The act did not mean that there was to
be an option as to who could bring the
suit. But this court construes it to mean,
that if there was a widow surviving she
could sue, and the right was vested in her
alone, and if there was no widow then the
children could sue, etc. We have examined and considered all the cases referred
to in the plaintiff's briefs, and are not convinced that they rule the case in hand.
Judgment for defendants.
H. P. KATZ, J.

JOHN MARTIN vs. AMOS WITSON.
Infants-Recission of Contract before arriving on age-Plea in abatementNecessaries.
STATENTENT OF THE CASE.

John Martin being but 20 years of age,
bought of Amos Witson a typewriter for
$90, one half of which he paid at the time
he took possession of the typewriter, and
gave a note for 60 days for the balance.
After using the typewriter for six months,
he became dissatisfied with it and tendering the typewriter to Witson, demanded
his note, which had been renewed from
time to time and also the $45 which he
had paid at the time of the purchase.
Witson declined to deliver over the money
and note, hence this suit for its recovery.
The typewriter had been used very hard,
and showed signs of severe usage.
PIPER and RHODES, F. for plaintiff.
LIGHTNER and RHODES, J. for defend-

ant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action is brought by an infant, to
recover money paid by him to the vendor
of a typewriter. After the typewriter had
been sold, and a portion of the purchase
money paid, possession of it was taken by
the infant, and he continued to use it for
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the space of Aix months. He then changed
declared for him, does not require the
his mind and decided to return the instru- mental strength of an adult. Hence,
inent, demanding the return of the money seemingly, the infant may, even during
paid by him. The vendor, thinking the his infancy, annul the contract. Cf. Rice
money equivalent of the damage to the v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578; McCarthey v.
typewriter at least equal to the money, Henderson, 138 Mass. 310; Pyne v. Wood,
declined to return it.
145 Mass. 558; 16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 298;
The action is in the name of the infant. or he may wait till a reasonable time has
Regularly, it should have been brought by elapsed after reaching his majority.
his guardian or, there being none, by his
The plaintiff returned the typewriter,
next friend, but as no plea in abatement
with the intention to rescind the contract.
has been filed, no advantage can be taken
It was not in as good condition as it had
of this irregularity, Heft v. McGill, 3 Pa. been when he received it. But, if the use
256.
of a thing sold to an infant, precluded his
It is well settled that contracts made by recovering the money spent for it, the iminfants are,, generally, voidable by them.
munity of infancy would be seriously curAn exception exists when the contract tailed; 16 Am. & Eng. Encyc., 293; Shaw
was for the purchase of a "necessary."
v. Boyd, 5 S.& R. 309. There can be no
Such a contract is voidable only as to the doubt that when the plaintiff returned the
price. If the contract price is, in the typewriter to the defendant, he released
judgment of the jury, more than a reasonhimself from liability for the unpaid porable one, only a reasonable price can be re- tion of the purchase-money. But this accovered; but the infant cannot repudiate tion is for the recovery from the vendor of
the contract in toto. It would not be prac- the purchase money paid to him at the
ticable to furnish a list of articles that making of the contract. Often a contract,
might properly be deemed "necessaries."
if rescinded, is rescinded in toto. It is not
Food and clothing in certain quantities are logically necessary however, when treatsuch. Implements of trade maybe. Run- ing a contract as dissolved for the future,
del v. Keeler, 7 W. 237; Mohney v. Evans, to deny its operation so far as past per57 Pa. 80. Books, the instruments of the formances under it are concerned. We
education of the mind, may be and we see may properly adopt the principle of Rice
no reason to deny to the typewriter that v. Butler, 160 N. Y.578, that "the plaintiff
quality, if the object of its possession is to having had the use of the typewriter [bienable the infant to qualify himself to earn cyle] during the time intervening between
a livelihood. Unfortunately, the circum- his [her] purchase and its return, ought,
stances of the plaintiff and his object in in justice and in fairness, to account for its
making the purchase, are not disclosed to reasonable use or deterioration in value.
us. As it is for the jury to say whether Otherwise he [she] would be making use
any given thing is a necessary, the absence of the privilege of infancy as a sword, and
of evidence upon the point prohibits our not as a shield." As the money paid to
submitting the question to them. Cf. 16 the defendant is the equivalent of the
Am. & Eng. Encyc., 278, 279.
damage to the machine from its use, we
The typewriter not having been a neces- think we were right in instructing the
sary, the infant vendee had the power to jury that the verdict should be for the deannul the sale. Was this power uncon- fendant.
New trial refused.
ditional? The plaintiff wwa still a minor,
when he rescinded the sale, and brought
the action. Should he have waited till his
THE MARS CONSOIDATED GOLD
majority? The right to rescind does not MINING CO. vs. WM. SKEAN, ETAL.
rest on the possession of discretion by the Ejecment for public landsunder title acinfant at the moment of rescission, but on
quiredfrom United States.
the want of it, at the moment of making
the contract. In the judgment ofthelaw,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
the contract ought not to have been made.
Sometime during the year 1891, one
For the infant to declare what the law has Robert Womax located a placer claim
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known as the "Womax Placer," situated
in the Cripple Creek Mining District. El
Paso County, Colorado. He afterwards
transferred his interests by mining deed to
Willots and Mannix. In September, 1892,
Willots and Mannix mad4 final proof upon
this Placer claim, in the United States
Land Office at Pueblo, Colorado and paid
the purchase of five ($5.00) dollars per acre
therefor and received what is known as
the Receiver's Final Receipt. The holder
of the final receipt, Willots and Mannix,
laid this placer claim off into tow.n lots
and sold from said lots to one William
Skean by oral contract in March, 1893,
four lots, for which William Skean made
part payment and took a receipt therefor
and entered into possession of said lots
and has remained in exclusive possession
eversince. In February, 1894, a Warranty
deed was made for said lots to William
Skean apd since that time the grantee has
made valuable and lasting improvements
by erecting a house on each lot and has
paid all the tax that was legally assessed
against said lots ever since. Prior to the
above contract, the land in contention was
platted and filed in regular order as an
addition to the City of Cripple Creek.
After said Receiver's Receipt was issued
and before patent was issued, a protest was
filed in the land office at Washington
against the issuing of said patent to said
Placer Claim.
That upon a hearing had on said protest
the Receiver's Receipt to said claim was
set aside and cancelled in March, 1896.
Lode claimants then filed location covering all said placer grounds including the
four lots in question, and in July 9th,
1899, a patent for said lode lands was issued and they now bring suit in ejectment
against William Skean for the recovery
and possession of that portion of the lode
claim covered by the lots that he claims to
own.
William Skean was an innocent purchaser of the property in controversy, and
relied upon the Receiver's Final Receipt,
issued to Willots and Man nix for the placer
deed to him as conveying a good title.
In my answer to the complaint I have
set up two defenses. First, that the warranty deed received from Willots and
Mannix, prior to the cancellation of the

final receipt to them and from which there
was no appeal taken from the local land
office, Pueblo, Colorado as conferring valid
title to an innocent purchaser for valuable
consideration.
Second. That if the first contention is
not good we then rely upon being in possession under color of title for more than
seven years.
The statute relating to this is as follows:
(Every person in the actual possession of
lands or tenements, under claim and color
of title, made in good faith, and who shall,
for seven successive years, continue in such
possession and shall also, during said time,
pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands
or tenements, shall be held and adjudged
to be the legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the
purport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such possession by
purchase, devise or descent before said
seven years shall have expired and who
shall continue such possession, and continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid, so as to
complete the possession and payment of
taxes for the term aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit of this section.)
The above statute conforms exactly to
the Illinois statute on this question, and
the decisions of California, in regard to
mining laws, are generally followed in this
State.
Bonvyp and BASEHORtE for plaintiffs.
A patent is conclusive evidence of
title and the one holding a patent has the
legal title, and in the courts of the United
States the strict legal title prevails. 13
Pet. 436; 98 U. S. 425; 4 Pa. 28; 13 Colo.
478; 13 Pet. 496; 113 U. S. 550.
The cancellation of the "receiver's re"ceipt" divested all the rights to the land
which the defendant may have acquired.
Hutchings v. Low, 82 U. S. 77; Trisbie v.
Whitney, 76 U. S. 187.
A title cannot be acquired as against the
U. S. Government by prescription. 92U.
S. 443. 47 Colo., 570; 65 Colo., 94; 82 U. S.,
77.
EDWARDS ind Kim:P for defendant.
Claims to public mineral lands are considered as titles for all practical purposes.
The holder of a claim has the equitable
ownership. 15 Colo., 56; 7 Colo., 317; 116
U. S., 392.
A "receiver" cannot annul a certificate
after the rights of bona fide purchasers
have intervened. Tate v. Carney, 24 How,
357.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of ejec.tment, brought
by The Mars Consolidated Gold Mining
Company, a corporation organized under
the laws of Colorado, against William
Skean and others, to obtain possession of
a plot of land situated in the Cripple Creek
Mining district, El Paso County, Colorado.
It appears, from the evidence produced,
that the lands in question were, in 1891, a
portion of the piublic lands of the United
States and, as both parties to this action
claim under this common grantor, it will
be well for us to consider the question of
aliening the Public Lands.
Thd lands contained within the boundaries of the State of Colorado were acquired
by the United States from three distinct
and separate sources: The eastern portion
was originally a portion of the Lousiana
purchase, made by the Federal Government in 1803. Central Colorado, in which
the lands in question are situated, was a
part of the Texas annexation, effected in
1845. Western Colorado was acquired by
the United States as a partial result of conquest, being embodied in the vast territory
ceded to the United states by Mexico, in
1848, after the conclusion of the Mexican
War.
All these lands were held by the United
States, and Congress enacted certain laws
relative to their occupancy and ownership
by citizens of the United States, and the
nature of the question at issue prompts us
to consider these laws, and the various
effects which compliance therewith,
wholly or in part, will have on the title of
the prospective owner.
The United States owned and exercised
full authority over the entire Territory of
Colorado until 1876, when, in accordance
with an act of Congress in relation thereto, the Territory was admitted to Statehood. President Grant then issued his
proclamation declaring Colorado regularly
admitted as one of the United States.
The position of the United States, in
reference to the lands of Colorado after its
admission to Statehood, is ably defined by
Justice McKinley, of the United States
Supreme Court, in Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 3 Howard 224.
The learned judge said: "The United

States holds the public lands within the
new States connected with them by force
of the deeds of cession and the statutes,
and not by any municipal sovereignty
which it may be supposed they possess,
or have reserved by compact with the new
States, for that particular purpose."
This is further commented on by Justice
Flandrau, of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in The State of Minnesota v. Bachelder, 5 Minnesota 223. Judge Flandrau
said: "The interest of the United States
in lands held by it within State boundaries is simply proprietary. The sovereignty residing within the State and its
rights differ only from those of an ordinary
land holder in the State, only as provided
in the Constitution of the United States
and by the terms of the compact between
the General and the State Governments
at the time of the admission of the latter
into the Union."
The position of the Government of the
United States to the lands of Colorado is
therefore set forth in Section 2124 of the
Revised Statutes of Colorado, which provides: "To the United States of America
be conceded the right to dispose of the
soil of the State according to the laws existing or to be enacted by Congress."
This fact may, however, not be considered essential to the determination of the
question at issue, as Section 15, of the Act
of Congress creating the State of Colorado,
excepted mineral lands from operations
and grants of the Act. So that we infer
that the lands in question, being mineral
lands, were still public lands, and entirely
under the dominion aud authority of the
United States, and could only be aliened
by such methods as were provided by the
Acts of Congress.
We therefore feel compelled to base our
decision on the laws of the United States
as passed by Congress, and construed by
the Federal Courts, as well as on the laws
of the State of Colorado, as construed by
its courts. It is observable that the State
courts have generally observed the National laws in deciding questions of this
nature, there being no conflicting statutes
of Colorado, the Legislature concurring
with Congress in regard to the aliening of
public lands.
It being a well-founded fact, long recog-
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nized by the common law, and generally
unrepealed by statute, that in actions of
ejectment the plaintiff must recover upon
the strength of his title ratherthau on the
weakness of the title of the defendant,
we will consider first the title advanced
by the plaintiff, on the strength of which
it asks that the defendants be compelled
to deliver up to it the possession of the
lands in question.
The plaintiff presents proof that it was
a lode claimant prior to July, lb99, and
later than March, 1896. Also that it filed
location covering the grounds in question,
and that on July 9, 1899, a patent for the
said lode lands was issued to it.
This, in accordance with the Acts of
Congress, Sections 2318 to 2352, Revised
Statutes of the United States, would apparently give it an impregnable title, and
one which it would be easy to maintain.
The United States Statutes, Section 2318,
provide that "title to mineral lands can
only be acquired in the precise manner
provided by the laws relating to such
lands, and a patent obtained under the
provisions of any other law is void." This
title certainly seems to have been acquired
strictly in accordance with all the provisions of the Statutes of the United States.
The defendants, on the other hand, produce another and more complicated chain
of title, and we will next proceed to consider it. They prove that, in 1891, one
Robert Womax located a placer claim on
the lands in question, and claim title under his location, and insist that they have
a better right to the premises by virtue of
the previous occupation by Womax.
In 116 U. S. 687 the learrded court said:
"A placer location gives a qualified possession of the ground located." This,
then, would define the relation of Womax
to the land in question in 1891, and that
he could sell and legally convey his interest in the land was upheld in Myers v.
Croft, 13 Wallace 291, by Justice Davis.
Womax transferred his interest by mining deed to Willots and Mannix, whom
we shall hereafter consider in Womax's
stead, aS they were thus subrogated to his
place in the matter. Willotsand Mannix
made final proof upon the placer claim in
the United States Land Office, at Pueblo,
Colutxuo, paid the full purchase price of

$5.00 per acre, and received a "Receiver's
final receipt" therefor.
The issuance of this final receipt to Willots and Mannix gave them a strong
equitable title to the land, although the
legal title was still in the United States.
This position is ably defined by Judge
Helm, of the Colorado Supreme Court, in
Armstrong et al. v. Lower, 6 Colorado 393.
The learned judge there held: "Where one
has discovered a vein, and has complied
with the law in locating a claim thereon,
the territory enclosed within its surface
boundaries is segregated from the public
lands, in so far as all parties, except the
Government of the United States, is concerned. The locator is entitled to 1he exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof
until it is forfeited orabandoned." There
can therefore be no question that the title
of Willots and Mannix was good as against
all the world, save the United States.
Before going farther toward the completion of their title, Willots and Mannix
laid the claim off into town lots and sold
them to different of the defendants, particularly to William Skean, in March,
1893, four lots, by oral contract. Whether
this oral contract would be binding in the
matter does not appear, being rendered
immaterial by the subsequent action of
the parties, in Februay, 1894, in making
and delivering a warranty deed, which
the defendants offer. Skean made a partial payment, and took a receipt therefor,
entered into possession of the said lots, and
has remained in exclusive possession ever
since.
That this conveyance transferred to William Skean all the right, title and interest
of Willots and Mannix is not disputed, as
against all other parties, unless the said
Willots and Mannix should claim on account of the balance of the purchase money,
which does not appear in this case.
Skean, believing himself the owner,
made valuable improvements on the land
by erecting a house on each"lot. He also
paid the taxes which were from time to
time assessed against said lots.
This is the title presented by the defendants, consisting of a placer, or surface,
,claim, a transfer by mining deed, another
transfer by oral contract, confirmed later
by a Warranty deed, and a continuous
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possession of over seven years. The Statutes of Colorado providing: "Every person in the actual possession of lands or
tenements, under claim and color of title,
made in good faith, and who shall con
tinue in such possession, and shall also
during said time pay all the taxes legally
assessed against such lands or tenements,
shall be held and adjudged the legal owner
of said lands or tenements, to the extent
and according to the purport of his or her
paper title." And further: "All persons
holding under such possession by- purchase, devise or descent before said seven
years shall have expired, and who shall
continue in said possession, aisd continue
to pay the taxes, as aforesaid, so as to
complete the possession and payment of
taxes for the term aforesaid shall be entitled to the benefit of this section."
The defendant also claims that the warranty deed received from Willots and
Mannix conferred a valid title on Skean,
"1as an innocent purchaser for value."
The plaintiff, in further disputation of
the defendant's alleged title, proves that
Willots and Mannix, after the issuance of
the Receiver's final receipt, applied for a
patent on the lands in question in order
that they could complete their title to the
premises. That a protest was filed against
the issuance. of the patent, that the disputants were heard, and that the Receiver's final receipt to the claim was
careelled and set aside in March, 1896.
That this caused the lands to revert to the
United States, the grantor, and that they,
the plaintiff, subsequently became lode
claimants, to whom a patent was issued
on July 9, 1899, and that they have a perfect and superior title.
Justice Goddard, in the case of the
Mount Rose Mining, Milling and Land
Co. v. Palmer, 26 Colorado 56, said: "A
placer location and patent confers neither
title or right of possession to lodes and
veins known to exist within its limits at
the time the patent is applied for, and a
subsequent locator of such lode or vein is
not a trespasser on the rights of the placer
locator. A locator of a lode mining claim
acquires an estate and interest in real
property, and is treated as the owner in
fee as to every one, except the United
States. And he has such title as will sup-

port an action to quiet title under Section
255 of the Civil Code."
This would probably be the position of
the respective claimants had the patent
been issued to Willotsand Mannix and no
patent issued to the plaintiff. And the
fact that the first patent was refused, the
receipt cancelled, and the second patent issued, but strengthens the position of the
plaintiff.
Justice Lamar, in deciding the case of
Hastings, etc., Railroad Co. v. Whitney,
in 132 U. S. 857, speaking of an almost
similar condition of affairs as exist in this
case, said: "The fact that such an edtry
may not be confirmed by the Land Office,
on account of any alleged defect therein,
or may be cancelled or declared forfeited
on account of non-compliauce with the
law, or even declared void, AFTER A PATENT HAS ISSUED, on account of fraud, in
a direct proceeding for that purpose in the
courts, isan incident inherent in all entries
of pubulic lands." Also, "In the light of
these decisions, the almost uniform practice of the Department has been to regard
land, upon which an entry or record, valid
upon its face, has been made, as appropriated and withdrawn from homestead
entry, pre-emption, sale or grant, until
the original entry be cancelled or declared
forfeited, in which ease the land reverts
to the Government as part of the public
domain, and becomes again subject to entry under the land laws."
Justice Field, in 14.5 U. S. 535, said:
"Lands on which payment of the pur-.
chase money has been made, and a Receiver's recei pt given, are severed from the
mass of Public Land of the United States,
but whe-n the pre-emption was cancelled, it
simply restored the land to the mass of
Public Lands to be dealt with subsequently
in the same manner as any other public
lands of the United States."
In Foster v. Mora, 98 U. S. 425, Justice
Miller said: "In ejectment proceedings, in
the Courts of the United States, the strict
legal title prevails." Also that "if there
is any equitable reason why the only strict
legal title should not prevail, it is not
available in a Court of Law."
There can be but little question that the
legal title is in the plaintiff, inasmuch as
it has had the patent issued to it. In Bag-
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nell v. Broderick, 13 Peters 435, the court
said: "A patent from the United States is
conclusive evidence of a superior and a
legal title. Until it issues, the fee is in the
Government, which, by the patent, passes
to the grantee and he is entitled to recover
the possession in ejectment. It is denied
that S-tates have any power to declare certificates of purchase of equal dignity with
a patent, Congress alone can give them
such effect."
In Moore v. Wilkinson et al. 13 California 478, the courtsaid: "Thejudiciaryinust
determine whether the prior rights of
third persons have been interfered with by
the survey and patent, but it cannot correet the one or the other. Thesurvey and
patent are conclusive in actions of ejectment," also the 15th section of the act of
Congre.ss of 1851, provides: "That the final
decree of confirmation and patent shall be
conclusive between the United States and
the claimants. It must be equally so between persons holding under either of these
parties."
In Waterman v. Smith, 13 California,
373, the court said: "The patent is conclusive evidence of the right of the patentee
to the land described therein as between
himself and a third party who has not a
superiortitle from a source of paramount
proprietorship."
In Moore v. Smaw and Fremont v.
Flower, 13 Cal. .73, the court said: "The
patent from the United States passes to the
patentee all the interest of the United
States, whatever it may be, in everything
coinncted with the soil, or forming any
part of its bed or fixed to its surface; in
short, in everything embraced within the
term LAND "
Al though at first sight, we were inclined
to the opinion that the defendant was entitled to the lands in question, we must
admit that the great weight of authority
tends to an opposiie view. The long line
of precedents have established the fict that
the action of the officialsof the Land Office
is final and their refusal to grant a patent
to a party defeats his legal title to his
claim.
Justice Clifford, in decidingSecretary v.
McOarrahan, 9 Wallace 298, said: "The
granting of a patent for lands where proof,
hearing and decision is necessary, is not a

matter wherein the action of the Department of the Interior is subject to re-examination by the Supreme Court of the District. Mandamus to compel either the
Commissioner of the General Land Office,
or the Secretary of the In erior to issue a
patent cannot be sustained."
The plaintiff in this case relocated this
claim, as the refusal of the Land Office Officials to issue a patent to the grantors of the
defendants, puts the claim in the position
of an abandoned claim. Justice Helm,
of Colorado, in deciding the case of the
Pelican and Dives Mining Company v.
Snodgrasq, 9 Colorado 339. said: "The relocator of an abandoned mining claim has
the same length of time to perform each of
the acts of location subsequent to discovery
as the original locator."
As to the holding of the lauds adversely
for seven years, it would certainly avail
the defendants nothing to hold them thus
as, after the cancellation of the receipt. the
holding was adverse to the United States
Government, and such adverse holding
can impart no title.
The fact tlat the land was plotted as an
addition to the ci'y of Cripple Creek would
not, in our opinion, make any difference
in the acquiring of title as these were nineral lands, and no title from the United
States to lands known at the time of sale
to be valuable for their minerals, can be
obtained under the pre-emption or the
homestead laws, or the town site laws, or
in any other way than as prescribed by
the laws specially authorizing the sale of
such lands.
The Warranty Deed from Willots and
Mannix to Skean, "an innocent purchaser
for value," does not affect the claim of the
plaintiff. By the deed Skean acquired no
more title that hisgrautors had. As to his
being an innocent purchaser for value, the
facts of the case clea;ly establish his puerile innocence. This can have no possible
effect in the trnsferring of title to lands,
as the grantee gets no more than his
grantor has power to convey, under any
circumstances.
This being the case, to hold that a party,
having an inchoate and imperfect title,
could hold the land against one in whom
resided theperfect title, as a general proposition of law, unquestionably cannot be
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Thompson, has an adequate remedy at
law, for which reason this appeal should
be dismissed; it is true that Johnson would
be liable for a breach of the partnership
articles, resulting in damage, caused by
his leaving the firm before the expiration
of the agreed time; but it is also observed
that equity assumes considerable latitude
in this one particular department of its
jurisprudence, and will grant the prayers
of a bill for an accounting, when a remedy
does exist atlaw, and even when the affairs
of a partnership are not complicated.
Equity best serves the interests of both
THOMPSON vs. JOHNSON.
parties and since it has once assumed such
broad control of partnership affairs, it is
Billfor a partnershipaccount.
not its policy to dismantle itself. The
bill was properly brought and we refuse to
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
dismiss the appeal.
On August 11, 1897, Johnson and Jacob
Did the voluntary withdrawal of JohnThompson formed a partnership for four
son before the agreed time dissolve the
years, for the businessof making carriages.
firm?
It was agreed that Johnson should devote
In the case of Marsh's appeal 69 Pa. 30;
his time to the financial part of the busione of the members of a partnerGeddis,
Johnson
ness. At the end of two years,
ship to endure for ten years, withdrew
ceased to give his time and engaged in
after little more than a year's association,
other business. Thompson was compelled
to employ a clerk, at $800 ayear, to do the and ceased to give his attention to the
work thus neglected. By the clerk's neg- finances, (his peculiar ability, as in this
ligence, debts amounting to $2600 were case, having been the inducement which
lost to the firm. At the end of the four gave him that department). Thepartneryears, Thompson filed a bill in equity for ship was held not to have been dfssolved,
an account, and insisted that Johnson and he was'charged with services withheld.
In the case before us Johnson quietly
should be charged with $1600, the salary of
the clerk, plus $2500, the loss arising from ceased to attend to his assigned departthe clerk's negligence, plus a share of the ment, and engaged in other business, but
this alone is no evidence that he forsook
profits of the business that Johnson went
the firm;' he certainly was at liberty to
into, that of casting stoves, and an account
engage in other ventures, and furthermore
of which the bill also demanded.
Thompson would have no interest in his
DEAL and KEIP for plaintiff.
ast undertaking, no right to an account
A partner is chargeable with the value from Johnson, for a universal partnership
of personal services witheld. Marsh's
Appeal, 64 Pa. 30. A partner is liable to was not in contemplation.
Thoulpson had no official notice of his
account for losses caused by his neglect or,
misfeasance. 6 W. & S. 529; 8 Pa. C. C. partner's intent to withdraw, and would
Rep. 289.
be justified in believing.that Johnson still
HOLcomiB and PIPER for defendant.
considered himself a member, and further:
The plaintiff has a remedy at law. Part- wouhl be justified (aware of no express innership losses are to be bornq equally by -tention, as aforesaid) in believing that,
the partners A partner has the right to
engage in a business separate from the even though for the time Johnson was
firm. The clerk was the agent., of the not attending to the finances, he would,
plaintiff and the plaintiff is liable for the eventually, take his old place.
clerk's negligence.
We consider-the case of Marsh's appeal
OPINION OF THE COURT.
authority for the doctrine that the firm
It has been ably argued that Jacob was not dissolved.
Thompson, a general partner, then had
Thompson, complainant in the bill for an
account of the partnership of Johnson and power to employ a clerk to do Johnson's

maintained. There is nothing in this case
which impairs the right of the plaintiff to
the full enjoyment of its perfected title.
If the defendant has been wronged, we
are of the o. inion that, by institution of
the proper proceedings, as provided'in the
Act of Congress of June 1st, 1874, he can
obtain ample redress.
But the judgment of the court, on this
case as presented, must be entexed for the
plaintiff.
DANIEL KLINE,
J.
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work. It has been held that: "Where by
the articles of partnership, each takes a
certain branch, or one is exempted from
the duty of rendering his personal services
to the joint business, if he afterwards
does render such services at the instance
and request of his co-partners, he will be
entitled to a reasonable compensation
therefor."
As a corollary in Marsh's
appeal the auditor said: "The proof is
sufficient to sustain the amount charged
by claimants for loss of service, if, under
the law, they are competent to make the
charge." Williams, J., referring said:
"But why should there be a doubt in regard to their right to charge the defendant
with the amount of the loss? Why should
not a partner be just as responsible for the
breach of his agreement to render personal
services to the partnership, as for the
breach of any other stipulation in the partnership contract? No good reason can be
suggested why there should not be the
same rule of accountability in the one
case as i.n the other.
If Thompson had done Johnson's work
in addition to his own he could charge
reasonable value therefor, and surely, if
he had not the time or inclination, since
he could charge defendant, then he could
for money paid by him to the clerk.
Thompson rightfully employed the
clerk, and if he through negligence lost to
the firm $2.500, it must be equally borne.
We are not called upon to decide the incident equities arising above, between Johnson and Thompson.
We sustain the learned court below in so
far as it charges defendant with $1600, the
value of clerk hire to perform services due
from him but wrongfully withheld, but
as to the loss through negligence we reverse
to the extent that defendant be charged
with $1250 (one-half the loss) instead of
$2500. As said before, Thompson is not
entitled to an account of the profits of
Johnson's subsequent business.
The decree, therefore, so far as inconsistent herewith, must be set aside, and record remitted to Common Pleas with instructions to distribute the partnership
funds in accordance with this opinion.
Decree accordingly.

HARE vs. STANTON.
Ditinction between an offer and an4nvitation to deal -Effect of*an acceptance by
telegraph of an offer made by post.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Stanton, a wholesale grain dealer in
Chicago, wrote Hare in Philadelphia, that
he had on hand four cars of grain, the
whole or any part of which he would offer
at 60 cents per -bushel. Hare telegraphed
that he wanted "one car-load shipped at
once." After the sending of this telegram,
but before its receipt, Stanton received an
offer of 65 cents per bushel for all of his
grain, and this he accepted. This action
is brought by Hare for breach of contract.
HESS and CONRY for plaintiff.

The offer in this case is certain and definite and binds 'the defendant. Keller v.
Ybarru, 3 Cal. 147; Moulton v. Kershaw,
.59 Wis. 320; Schnectady v. Holbrook, 101
N. Y. 72.
An acceptance by any usual method of
communication is suffiient. Hamilton v.
Insurance Co.. 5 Pa. 339; Vassar v. Camp,
11 N. Y. 441; Trevar v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 310;
1 Wharton on Cont. sec. 19.
JOHNSTON and KATZ for defendant.

There was no offer here, but simlply an
advertisement. Allen v. Kirwan. 159 Pa.
618; Moulton v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 320;
Orr's Appeal, 67 Pd. 19.5.

The acceptance must be communicated
by the same medium as the offer. Hebb's
Case, L. R.. 4 Eq. 9; Thayer v. Ins. Co.,
10 Pick 326; Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 438.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant told the plaintiff that he
had on hand four carloads of grain, the
whole or any part of Which he would offer
at 60 cents per bushel. This was such an
offer as could be turned into a binding
agreement by the plaintiff's acceptance.
It has been contended that this is merely
an invitation to deal, and several cases,
some of them similar to this, have been
cited to support the argument. It does
not appear in this case that the offer was
in the nature of an advertisement, sent to
a number of firms or persons trading in
grain. It was a private business letter.
In the case at bar the offer was of a definite quantity; four carloads or such smaller
quantity as the plaintiff might desire.
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The plaintiff by his acceptance may make
the quantity certain and complete the essential terms of the contract. In this particular, the cases relied upon by the counsel for defendant differ materially from
this one. In the leading case of Moulton
v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316, the defendant
wrote to the plaintiff, "we are authorized
to offer Michigan fine salt, in full carload
lots of 80 to 95 bbls, delivered at your city
at 85 cents per barrel." The plaintiff telegraphed in reply, '"You may ship me 2,000
barrels Michigan fine-salt, as offered in
your letter." It was held that no contract
arose. It was contended for the plaintiff
that there was an offer to sell any reasonable quantitity of salt which the plaintiff
might see fit to order, not less than one
carload. The court decided that in construing the contract it could not go outside
of the written communications; that to determine what a reasonable quantity would
be, the jury would have to inquire into the
extent of each party's business; and that
if the letter constituted an offer to sell salt,
then it must be held to be all offer to sell
any quantity at the option of the plaintiff,
not less than one carload. "Rather than
introduce such an element of uncertainty
into the contract, we deem it much more
reasonable to construe the letter as a simple notice to those dealinrg in salt that the
appellants were in a condition to supply
that article for the prices named, and requesting the person to whom it was addressed to deal with them." Itisevident
that the controlling feature which turned
the mind of the court in the defendant's
favor, was the uncertain nature of the offer
made by him.
Again, the same court in referring to the
case of Keller v. Ybarru. 3 Cal. 147, says:
"The defendant in that case had a crop of
growing grapes, and he offered to pick
from the vines and deliver to theplaintiff,
at defendant's vineyard, so many grapes
then growing in said vineyard as the
plaintiff should wish to take during the
present year at ten cents per pound on delivery. Ti plaintiff vithin the time and
before the offer was withdrawn, notified
the defendant that he wished to take 1900
pounds of his grapes on the terms stated.
Tie court held there was a contract to deliver the 1900 pounds. In this case the

fixing of the quantity was left to the person to whom the offer was made, but the
amount which the defendant offered, beyond which he could not be bound, was
also'fixed by the amount of grapes he might
have in his vineyard in that year. The
case is quite different in its facts from the
case at bar." The case of Moulton v. Ker-.
shaw is as much different from the present
case.
In Allen v. Kirwan, 159 Pa. 618, the defendant wrote the plaintiff, "we have afew
jars that we can offer you at this time for
immediate acceptance." This was held
not to be such an offer as the defendant
could make binding by an acceptance by
telegram to, "Enter order for 500 gross
complete goods." Green, J. says, "The
offer was to sell afew gross. Such an offer
was of an indefinite quantity." In the
cases of Slaymaker v. Irwin. 4 Whart. 369,
and Sehnectady v. folbrook, 101 N..Y. 4.5,
the alleged offers were of a similar character. In the case at bar. then, the offer was
an effective one; and if the acceptance was
also suffiient, a binding agreement must
be held to have resulted.
Stanton made all offer by mail and Hare
accepted by telegram. So far as appears
in this case there was never any express
revocation of that offer. There was 'no
time specified within which the offer
must be accepted, and so we must hold
that Hare had a reasonable time in which
to accept.
He adopted the speediest
method at his command in communicating
the acceptance. It is apparent that he accepted within a reasonable time. If Stanton had named the medium by which the
acceptance was to be sent. all acceptance
sent by another mode would not have
been effective. Carr v. Duval. 14 Pet. 83.
The proposal did not designate a modie of
acceptance, and in such a case, an acceptance by any usual iode of doing business,
such as the post or telegraph, should be
sufficient. 1 Whart. on Cont. sec. 19.
There are cases holding that one making
an offer by mail, makes the post office his
agent to transmit the acceptance also, and
that an acceptance by any other mode is
not effective. Hebb's case, L. R.. 4 Eq. 9.
But the leading cases upon this subject do
not proceed upon this theory. To constitute a contract there must be a meeting of
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minds of the parties upon some distinct
proposition. When the parties are at a
distance from each other, communicating
by post or telegraph, it is impossible that
both should have a knowledge of the contract the moment it becomes complete.
From necessity in such a case, then, the
acceptance must be taken to be complete
when their intention toacceptis manifested
by some overt act. The mailing of a letter
or the sending of a telegram is such an act.
Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441; Trevar v.
Wood, 36 N. Y. 307; Taylor v. Ins. Co., 9
How. 390; Enmilton v. Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 339;
Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681.
The doctrine that the post becomes the
agent of the one making the offer for the
purpose of conveying the acceptance back
to him, rests upon an artificial assumption.
As a matter of fact it is well known that
the post does not, in any true sense, become his agent at all. An acceptance by a
usual mode, which is different from, but
more expeditious than the one employed
by the offerer is, we believe, an effective
acceptance. It is not necessary to decide
more than this in order to render judgment for the plaintiff. W. . CLAR,
.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

As the court below has justly said, but
two questions are here presented for discussion (1) Did Stanton make an offer,
and (2) Was this offer validly accepted.
Unfortunately, the precise words used
by Stanton are not before us. The special
verdict fin 's that he wrote to Hare, sttrting that he had four carsof grain, and that
he would offer all or any part of it at 60
cents per bushel. It is diffibult to avoid
seeing in this a technical offer. The letter
was to a determinate person. It named
the precise quantity of grain to be disposed
of, and the price per bushel. In Allen v.
Kerwan, 159 Pa. 612; the vendors stated
that they had a "few jars that we (they)
can offer you (the vendee) at this time for
Immediate acceptance at $8.00 for 1 qts.,
etc. The vendee replied, "enter order for
500 gross complete goods." Thecourtheld
that no contract had been made. The
offer was of a "few jars." The acceptance
was of 500 gross. The non-responsiveness
of the acceptance to the offer would have
been enough to induce the court to say that

there was no contract. Stanton's offer
was of four car-loads or any less amount.
The acceptance was of one carload. We
are not to understand from Allen v. Kerwan, that a proposal of any quantity up to
a designated maximum, cannot be treated
as an offer, and that until the party to
whom it is sent orders a definite quantity
and this order is in turn accepted by the
proposer, no contract can emerge.
The next point to be considered is, was
Stanton's offer duly accepted? The offer
was by letter. The acceptance was by
telegram. It was in fact received, and, if
not before, it was at least then, operative
as an acceptance. But before the receipt
of it, Stanton, receiviiig the offer of a
better price, had sold the grain to another.
The offer named no time in which it must
be accepted. It was made by letter. The
offerer was in Chicago, and the offeree in
Philadelphia. A reasonable time in which
to decide whether to accept the offer, and
in which to notify Stanton of the acceptance was by the law accorded to Hare.
So far as appears, he decided promptly.
He also adopted a more expeditious means
of communicating his decision than that
which the offerer employed. Had he
used the mail, he would doubtless have
been held to have exercised reasonable
promptness.
Indeed the defendant
censures him for not using it. Now
Hare's telegram was received in due
time, and Stanton was therefore informed
of his acceptance sooner than he could
have insisted on being informed. In the
absence of a specification of a mod6 of
acceptance, the mode can never be important, if the acceptance is in fact communicated in the time required by the offer or
by the law. The case then is that Stanton
offered the grain, and, within the reasonable time, Hare informed him that it
was accepted. And this communication
of acceptance occurred without any communication of a change of Stanton's purpose.
Much energy of logic was expended in
the argument, on the proposition that as
the offer was sent by mail, it could be accepted only by mail. We are aware of no
such principle. An offer may be orally
made, and accepted by letter; or made by
letter and accepted orally. Any ordinary
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and effective means of communicating acceptance can be employed by the offeree,
unless his liberty in this regard has been
curtailed by the offer. The mere selection of one of several practicable ways of
sending an offer over a distance, cannot be
understood to prohibit the acceptance of
it, by any other mode which is as expeditious as, or more expeditious than, that
employed by the offerer.
Had Stanton, after changing his mind,
sent a telegram withdrawing the offer it
might be important to know whether this
telegram was dispatched before or after the
dispatch of the acceptance, and, if after,
whether the mere dispatch of the acceptance was, in law, an acceptance. An
argument more or less plausible, might be
be made that as the offer was by letter, the
acceptance would need to be by letter, in
order that the initial point of its transmission should in law be the date at which
the offer became irrevocable. But as
Stanton sent no revocation whether by
mail or telegraph, it becomes unnecessary
to decide whether, had he done so after
Hare sent his telegram, it would have
been effectual to withdraw the offer. We
think, however, that the learned court
below correctly held that the acceptance
by telegram was valid from the moment of
the commencement of the transmission.
Judgment affirmed.
SARAH JONES vs. THOMPSON & CO.
Liability of a new partnerfor a debt of
the old firm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mrs. Jones lent $1000 to the firm ofThompson & Co. in March, 1898, when it was
composed of Win. Thompson and Jared
Jackson. and she was credited with that
sum on its books. On June 13th Jackson
sold out his interest in thefirm to Andrew
Harper. The busine.s continued to be
transacted under the same firm name
(Thompson & Co.). Interest was paid every
six months on the note to Mrs. Jones, and
credits for the payments were entered in
the books on July 10, 1898; Jan. 10, 1899;
July 10. 1899. Mrs. Jones then demanded
the money and on failure to-get it brought
this suit against Wim. Thompson and

Andrew Harper trading as Thompson &
Co. The sale of Jackson's interest to
Harper was by a writing which said that
it was subject to all the existing debts of
the firm. Harper offered to show that he
did not know of the debt; nor of payments
of interest on it, and that he would not
have consented that any of the funds of
the firm should be applied to it.
STAUFFER and WALSH for plaintiff.
A person not a party to a contract may
sue upon it amid recover, where one of the
parties holds money for his benefit, or
where one party buys the businessofanother and agrees to become liable for the debts
of the vendor and the plaintiff is a 'reditor
of the vendor. Delp v. Brewing Co. 123
Pa. 42; Bellasv. Fagely, 19 Pa. 273; Justice
v. Tallman, 86 Pa. 147; Wynn's Adm. v.
Wood, 97 Pa. 216.
NCctOLLS and WATSON for defendant.
An incoming partner is not liable for
prior debts in the absence of an agreement
to that effect between the creditor and the
entire new firm. To show an agreement
between the retiring and the incoming
partner is notsufficient. Krountzv. Bolthouse, 85 Pa. 237; Shamburg v. Ruggles,
83 Pa. 148; Hart v. Kelley, 83 Pa. 292; Ash
v. Seltzer, 12 Sup. C't. 39.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question involved is, whether one
partnership can assign a debt in the transfer of its property so that the creditor may
sue the vendee or assignee, without actual
discharge of the original debtor. The general rule is, that a person not a party to a
contract can not sue thereon, Campbell v.
Laycock. 40 Pa. .448; Morrison v. Buckley,
6 Watts 349; Delph v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa.
42; but this admits of several very important exceptions, (1) In case of a novation;
(2)Where the promise to pay rests upon
the fact that money or property is placed
in the hands of the promissor for that purpose and (3) where one buys out the stock
of a trade.man to take the place, fill the
contracts to pay the debts of the vendor.
Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 85. It seems to
us that the case at bar falls within the last
two rules and that the new firm composed
of the member of the old firm Wn. Thompson,and the new member, Andrew Harper,
should satisfy the obligation of the old
firm, Delp v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42. The
mere fact that Harper did not know of the
debt's existence is not a valid defense. We
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can not relieve a person from a voluntary
obligation every time he makes a poor
bargain.
Hence judgment should be
given for plaintiff and it is so ordered.
HESS, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

Two questions are presented by this case
(1) Did the purchase by Harper of the interest of Jackson, impose on him a duty
towards Sarah Jones to pay her debt; and
(2) If it did not, did the subsequent payument to her of interest by the new firm,
composed of Thompson and Harper, either
bindingly recognize, or create and impose,
such a duty.
It may be conceded, we think, that had
Harper, when making the purchases,
promised Jackson to pay the firm debts,
any creditors could have taken advantage
of this promise, and maintained an action
upon it. Delp v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42;
Gregg v. Allen, 180 Pa. 611; Wynn v.Wood,
97 Pa. 216. But did he make such a promise? The bill ofsale to Harper of Jackson's
interest stated that the sale wa' "subject
to all existing debts of the firm." Cases
are not infrequent in which land, charged
with encumbrances, is sold, "under and
subject to" such incumbrances. It has
been understood that such a phrase does
not import a promise by the grantee to pay
the debts, but a promise merely to idemnify the grantor, should he be compelled
to pay them; Green v. Rick, 121 Pa. 130 ;
Davis' Appeal, 89 Pa. 272; and that the
owner of the encumbrance cannot compel
the grantee to discharge it by payment.
Moore's Appeal, 88 Pa. 450. Someexpress
promise to pay would need to accompany
this phrase, in order to create a personal
liability. Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78.
There ought to be no difference in the signification of the words when used in relation to a sale of land, and when used in
relation to a sale of personalty. The sale
of Jackson's interest did not detach the
partner's lien for debts, and the words
"subject to debts" indicated that Harper
was to take the risk of such debts, and in
addition was to idemnify Jackson, if he
should be compelled to pay them. They
cannot be umderstood to promise to pay
the creditors, who, consequently, cannot
found an action on them.

If it be still insisted that these words
contain a promise, what promise is it? Is
it to pay all the debts or only half of them?
Is it a several promise to pay all or half,
or is it to be regarded as made jointly with
Thompson? The action is against Thompson and Harper, trading as Thompson &
Co., and it is quite clear that the negotiation between Harper and Jackson cannot,
by any ingenuity, be fashioned into a
promise bythe new firm. The new firm
was brought into existence by a different
and a later act. If Harper's liability rests
on his promise to Jackson, Thoftipson's
pla4nly does not. Their liabilities, therefore, having different bases, are not joint
and unitary, and cannot be enforced in an
action against them as partners.
We are now to consider whether any
recognition of the debt, as of the new firm
of Thompson & Co.,has in fact made itsuch
a debt. The business continued to be
transacted under the same firm name.
Interest was paid to Sarah Jones on July
10th, 1898; January 10th, 1899, and July
10th, 1899, and credits for such payments
were entered in the firm's books. They,
standing alone, might have justified the
inference that the new firm had promised
to pay the note and possibly that in consideration thereof, ]M4rs. Jones had agreed
to refrain from immediately requiring payment. Could such promise and such consideration have been legitimately deduced
from the evidence, it would have been
sufficient to sustain the action. ButHarper offered to show that he did not know of
Mrs. Jones' debt, nor of the payments of
interest upon it, and that he would not
have consented that any of the funds of
the firm should be applied to it. We
think this evidence should have been received,.and that, had it been, the court
would have been obliged to tell the jury
that, if they found it true, they could not
properly infer a contract of the new firm
to pay the debt of the old. Thompson
was not constituted by the formmltion of
a second partnership theagent of Harper to
pay or to assume debts originating under
the former. It does not appear that he
knew of the terms of the sale of Jackson to
Harper. Without this knowledge he could
not have supposed, nor would Harper be
bound to suspect that he would suppose
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that he had authority to pay the Jones'
debt. No element of estoppel existsin the
case. Mrs. Jones did not lend the money
on the supposition that the new firm was
liable for it. It does not appear that she
agreed to extend the credit, on the promise
of Thompson, for the new firm, that it
would pay her. It is not clear that had
there been such a promise she had furnished sufficient consideration to make it
binding. At all events, whether she had
or not, was a question which the court
could not answer. It was for tle jury.
Judgment reversed with venire facias
de novo.
PHILA. PRESS vs. WM. POTTER.
Contract-Sipulationfor noticeMutuatity-Damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On May 11, the Press engaged Potter to
write editorials on financial and political
subjects for the following 18 months at
$150 a month, stipulating that on two
weeks' notice the Press might at any time
terminate the engagement. Potter's articles were satisfactory for several months
when he wrote one advocating fiscal
measures which it was the policy of the
Press to oppose. He also wrote a political
article not consonant with the views
usually advocated by the paper. He was
therefore notified that at the end of one
month his services would be no longer
needed. Potter, without notifying the
Press of his intentions, quit the next day.
The action Is for damages arising from
the failure to perform his services according to the contract, alleged to amount to
$100.
PHILLIPS and YEAGLEY for plaintiff.

A person is bound by any valid contract
he may make. Harrison & Co. v. More &
Co., 8 C. C. 224.
A person is liable in damages for failure
to carry out his contract. Arthur v.Oaks,
11 C. C. A. 216.
WRIGHT and ]KAUFFMAN for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff's statement reads "On May
11th The Press engaged Potter to write editorials ** * for the following eighteen
months at $150 a month stipulating that

on two weeks' notice The Presq might at
any time terminate the engagement." To
engage is to place under obligation to d9 or
forbear doing something, to bind by contractorpromise; Webster. Anengagement
to do or omit to do something amounts to
a promise: Rue v. Rue, 21 N. J. Law 369.
The declaration further sets out that the
parties entered upon the performance of
these engagements. This language in substance alleges that the defendant made
certain promises, that he undertook either
expressly or impliedly to perform certain
services.
It was expressly decided in Pilkington
v. Scott, 15 M. &. W. 657, that agreements
whereby, in substance, workmen engaged
to serve certain persons for a term of years
at a certain scale of wages with powers to
the employers to dismiss the workmen on
certain notice, were not open to the objection of "being unilateral and not mutual."
Says Alderson, B., "The workman agrees
to serve them during the seven years on
certain terms and they agree to pay him
certain wages. * * * Then they are to have
the option of dismissing him from their
services on giving a month's wages or a
month's notice. All these provisions being taken together it appears to-me that
the agreement points clearly to an undertaking on the part of the master to employ
the workman for the seven years subject to
the notice, and on the part of the workman
to serve them for that period on the same
terms. That is a reasonable bargain having its foundation in a good consideration,
namely the agreement to employ him."
See also: Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 247;
Down v. Pinto, 2 C. L. R. 547, 6 J. Fisher's
Dig. 8860; Parker v. Ibbettson, 4 C. B. n.
s. 347; Regina v. Welsh, 2 E. &. B. 857. In
Mallory v. Mackaye, 34 U. S. C. C. A. R.
653, Mackaye covenanted to serve for a
period of ten years from July 1, 1879, unless Mallory should tree fit at the end of any
year to terminate the contract, and MallQry covenanted to pay an annual salary
in equal monthly installments. Mackaye
in January, 1881, abandoned the employment. The court recognized the mutuality of this contract and held that Mackaye
had broke his contract and that the contract was entire and denied Mackaye any
remedy saying, "A court of equity cannot
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relieve a party from the consequences of
his breach of such a contract, and has no
more power to interfere with it than a
court of law."
In Lyon v. Pollard, 20 Wall. 403, "Either
party was at liberty to terminate the contract by giving thirty days' notice in writing." The breach alleged was that the
defendant dismissed the plaintiff October
4th without havinggiven herthestipulated
notice. The defendant asked the court to
charge "that even if the notice of July 11 th
had been wholly withdrawn, the subseq'ient notice of Sept. 19th was in legal effect
a renewal of it, and of itself operated to
terminate the contract at the expiration of
tlirty days from its date." The court's
refusal so to charge was held to be error.
Jubtice Miller says, "The only object or
purpose of any notice in the case was to
apprise the party on whom it was served
that the other party intended to terminate
the contract. The contract itself fixed the
time when this should take place, namely
thirty days after the service. *** This
notice of intent the contract makes effectual at the end of thirty days and so the
court was asked to instruct the jury. * * *
It is probable that if the first notice was
wholly waived or abandoned the defendant had no right to dismiss the plaintiff
until the 19th day of October. But even
in reference to damages defendant had a
right to show that under the contract and
the notice she had only fifteen days to remain and was injured only tothat extent."
In K. v. Rascher, 10 J.Fisher's Dig. 16295,
a clerk was engaged at $1200 per annum
and was to have one month's notice of dismissal. He began his duties on the 2nd
ofJuly and served till August 1st. He was
then obliged by illness to b.e absent till the
2nd of September, when he tendered his
services which were refused. He had in
the meantime received on the 20th of Aug.
a letter from his master terminating the
engagement. In an action for wages from
August ist to September 20th It was held
that he was entitled to wages for that
period. Special terms requiring a certain
previous notice to terminate, even if more
favorable to one than the other, must be
mutually respected: Preston v. American
Linen Co., 119 Mass. 400; Naylor v. Fall
River Iron Works Co., 118 Mass. 317; Part-

ington v. Womsutta Mills, 110 Mass. 467.
It follows from these decisions that Pot-ter was bound to serve eighteen months
unless The Press exerc;ised its option to
terminate the engagement in which event
he was bound to serve so much of the
eighteen months as The Press designated.
The Press designated the limit of the engagement "at the end of one month," but
Potter "quit the next day" thereby failing
to perform one month's services which by
the terms of the contract he had agreed to
perform. The fact that The Press gave
Potter one month's notice, being bound to
give him only two weeks' notice, can be
tortured neither into a breach on the part
of the plaintiff nor into an excuse for the
breach of the defendant.
With the amount of damages we have
nothing to doat this stage of the procedure.
Defendant's deinurrer is therefore overruled.
WARREN L. SHIPMAN, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The learned argument of the counsel for
the appellant has not convinced us of any
error comfaitted by the court below.
The engagement of Potter, as we understand it, was for 18 months with the right
of the Press to terminate it at any time,
after two weeks' notice. Potter had no
option to cease to serve the Press, prior to
the expiration of the 18 months. The option was with the Press alone. Contracts
are by no means rare, in which one of
the contracting parties only has an option;
and their validity has not been seriously
contested. Nor do we understand that the
validity of this contract is denied. The
disputation concerns simply the interpretation of it.
The character of the service stipulated
for is such that it was highly important
that the Pressshould be able to di.continue
it. The right to do this it has reserved, on
the condition that the discharge of Potter
should not take place until he had had
two weeks' notice. The object of this
notice is not difficult to divine. The
appellant complains that a four weeks'
notice was not authorized by the contract,
and that it was, therefore, either null and
void of result, or that it justified Potter in
Immediately quitting his employment.
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Neither of these propositions can we accept. If two weeks' notice to Potter was
useful as giving him an opportunity to
obtain employ elsewhere, four weeks'
notice would be more useful. Discharge
on the day on which it was signified to
take effect, was within the competence of
the Press, if notice preceded it by a fortnight. The notice four weeks before would
linger in the memory of Potter, we must
presume, for the two weeks before and the
two weeks after the time mentioned in the
contract. It would be singular if excess
of that notice, above that which the Press
was bound to give, should injure it.
The giving of the notice did not, in the
intention of the parties, simultaneously
terminate the relation between them.
Potter had a right to be continued in the
employ for two weeks thereafter. It was
also plainly the right ofthe Press that he
should so continue. He had agreed in
substance that he would serve the Press
for 18 months, or for such shorter time
that it should elect, provided that two
weeks' notice should precede the termination. Within the 18 months the right of
selecting a time for the cessation of the
employment was wholly with the Press.
It was exercised with liberality towards
Potter. It was his duty to continue to
serve until, the time indicated in the
notice. The able opinion of the learned
Court of Common Pleas amply justifies the
overruling of the demurrer, and the subsequent'submission of the case to the jury.
Judgment affirmed.

ORUM.
Persons who had been practicing for three
years were not obliged to stand the examination but on proof of their three years'
practice were entitled to the license on
payment of the fee. Ropes had been practicing the barber's trade for two years and
eleven months when the law was enacted.
He was not able to stand the examination
and therefore did not offer himself to the
board for a license. le continued to practice. The act, making this a misdemeanor,
without a license, he was Indicted. The
special verdict of the jury finds these facts.
F. H. RHODES and KOSTENEAUDER for
Com.
The Act is constitutional and is not unlawful interference with rights of persons.
Coin. v. Taylor, 2 Luzerne Legal Reg. 364;
Dent v. W. Va.. 129 U. S. 114. Law cannot be held void because it is contrary to
principles of justice. Calder v. Bull, 3
Dail 385.
STERRETT and MOON for defendant.

Act is ex post facto as applied to this
case. Coin. v. Wasson, 3 C. L. M. & R.
726. Act unlawfully deprives defendant
of property. Ritter'v. Rodger, 8 C. C. 451;
Traig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 413.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The disposition of the case before us involves a decision as to the constitutionality
of the statute under which the defendant
was indicted. The decision as to the constitutionality of the act, so far as this case
is concerned, comprises two questions.
1. Is the Act ex post facto so far as it relates to the offence charged in this case?
2. If not, is the Act an unlawful interference with the rights or liberty of perCOMMONWEALTH vs. WM. ROPES. sons, or in other words, is the passage of
such an Act within the police power of the
Legislature? We will consider these quesUnconstitutionalLaw-ExpostFactoLaw
tions in order.
-Police Power.
The only class of ex post facto laws which
it could be urged this Act comes under is
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
the first class, enumerated by the United
States Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 3
In 1898 the legislature of the state passed
Dali. 386, viz., "Every law that makes an
an act forbidding any person to practice
action done before the passing of the law,
the business of a barber, unless he obtained
and which was innocent when done, crtma license for which $5.00 was to be paid.
Those were entitled to the license who suc-- inal; and punishes such action." But we
cessfully passed an examination before a
think a careful consideration of the case
before us shows that this was not done by
board in the art: the use of the razor, etc.,
the diseases of the skin of the face and
the passage of the Act in question, for the
neck and scalp, the means of avoiding the jury has found that the defendant without
license continued to practice after the pascommunication of such diseases, etc.
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sage of the Act, and the Act making this
(to wtt,.the practicing without license after
the passage of the Act) a misdemeanor, he
was indicted. He is not indicted for any
action done before the passage of the Act,
but on the contrary for actions done after
its passage.
The words of Justice Woodward in Com.
v. Taylor, 2 Kulp 364, in which case the
defendant, a physician, was indicted for
violating a statute somewhat analagous in
principle to the one in question, and under
somewhat similar circumstances, seem to
bevery applicable to this case. The learned
Justice said in part, "Nothing done by
him (the defendant) before the Act of Assembly and which was then innocent, is
now made criminal, nor is he charged with
any offense of that character. But it is
alleged against him that after the passage
of the Act * * * and with full knowledge of
its requirements, lie continued in the
practice of a professibn for which he did
not possess the necessary and legal requirements."
In Kring v. Mo., 107 U. S. 221, 22.5, Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the
court said in regard to ex post facto laws,
"Whether it is ex post facto or not relates
* !* to the time at which the offense
charged was committed. If the law complained of was passed before the commission of the act with which the prisoner is
charged, it cannot as to that offense, be an
ex post facto law."
In Dent v. W. Va., 129 U. S. 114, 122,
the defendant was indicted for continuing to practice medicine without having
obtained a certificate from the State Board
of Health as required by the Act of Assembly of W. Va. (he not having been practicing long enough to come within the exemption from examination contained in
the Act) and his conviction wasaffirmed by
the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Field saying, in reply to the objection that
the Act deprived the defendant of the right
to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he might choose, "there is no
arbitrary deprivation of such right where
its exercise is not permitted because of a
failure to comply with the conditions imposed by the state for the protection of
society."
That the law in question is retrospective

is conceded. It took away the right of the
defendant to practice his business except
upon certain conditions, yet there is no
unlawful deprivation, Dent v. W. Va.,
sufira, and we are of the opinion that this
does not make it unconstitutional, Lane
v. Nelson, 2 W. N. C. 216, Grim v.. Sebool
District, 57 Pa. 433, and do not feel justified
in holding it so because it may seem oppressive. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386; Com.
v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle 373.
We are therefore of the opinion that the
Act under which Ropes was indicted is not
ex post facto as regards this case and does
not unlawfully deprive him of any rights.
We are aware this conclusion is apparently
inconsistent with that reached in Com. v.
Wasson, 29 Pitts. L. J.434, by so eminent
a jurist as Justice Wickes, but we are of
the opinion that the view above expressed
is the correct one anid is supported by principle as well as authority.
The conclusion reached in regard to the
first question makes it necessary for us to
consider the second one. That the Legislature has power to pass Acts requiring
persons to pass examinations, or in some
other mnanner evidence their anility before
practicing different professions, has been
decided by many courts. But the Act hi
question requires persons to have special
training before practicing as a barber. "A
barber cannot be regarded as a professional
man, but is at best a skilled laborer,and
how far legislation of a similar nature
should be extended may be justly regarded
as important, but we are of the opinion
that the propriety or justice or policy of
such legislation is for the legislative departmentto determine. The protection against
unwise or oppressive legislation is by an
appeal to the representatives of the people.
The people can correct the evil but the
courts cannot assume their rights. P. R.
R. v. Ribbet, 66 Pa. 164, 169.
The ac, in question may seem contrary
to justice, or indeed unwise but weare not
for this reason authorized to hold it void;
asis shown by Com. v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle
374, in which case Justice Rogers said: "If
the legislature should pass a law in plain
and unequivocal language, within the general scope of their constitutional powers, I
know of no authority in this government
to pronounce such an act void, merely be.
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cause in the opinion of judicial tribunals
it was contrary to the opinion of natural
justice, for this would be vesting in the
court a latitudinarian authority which
might be abused, and would necessarily
lead to collision between the legislative
andjudicial departments, dangerous to the
well being of society, or at least not in hariony with the structure of our ideas of
natural government."
In Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 87,
Field, J., says, "All sorts of restrictions
and burdens are imposed under the police
power, and when these are not in conflict
with any constitutional prohibition or
fundamental principles they cannot be
successfully assailed in ajudicial tribunal."
We are not prepared to hold that the Act
is an improper exercise of the police power
and that its regulations do not have reference to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society.
In declaring this Act void we would
necessarily overrule the decision of the
Legislature where it must be assumed to

have acted on its best judgment and this
will not be done until the duty becomes
manifestly imperative. We do not say we
have no doubt as to the validity of such
legislation but a doubt as to its constitutionality is not sufficient to warrant the
law being set aside. In Fletcher v. Peck,
6 Cranch 87, 128, the court said, "It is not
on slight implication and vague conjecture
that the legislature is to be pronounced to
have transcended its powers and its Acts
to be considered void," and in Ogden v.
Saunders, 12 Wheat 213, 269, it was said "It
is but a decent respect due to the wisdom,
the integrity and the patriotism of the
legislative body by which any law is passed
to presume in favor of its validity until its
violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt."
We are not satisfied that the passage of
the Act in question was an improperexercise of the police power. We therefore sustain its validity, and enter judgment on
the special verdict in favor of the Commonwealth.

W. A. VALENTINE, J.

